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Hamilton’s Rule and its Discontents 
Jonathan Birch 
(forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science) 
 
ABSTRACT 
In an incendiary 2010 Nature article, M. A. Nowak, C. E. Tarnita and E. O. Wilson present a savage critique of 
the best known and most widely used framework for the study of social evolution, W. D. Hamilton’s theory of 
kin selection. Over a hundred biologists have since rallied to the theory’s defence, but Nowak et al. maintain that 
their arguments ‘stand unrefuted’. Here I consider the most contentious claim Nowak et al. defend: that 
Hamilton’s rule, the core explanatory principle of kin selection theory, ‘almost never holds’. I first distinguish 
two versions of Hamilton’s rule in contemporary theory: a special version (HRS) that requires restrictive 
assumptions, and a general version (HRG) that does not. I then show that Nowak et al. are most charitably 
construed as arguing that HRS almost never holds, while HRG buys its generality at the expense of explanatory 
power.  While their arguments against HRS are fairly uncontroversial, their arguments against HRG are more 
contentious, yet these have been largely overlooked in the ensuing furore. I consider the arguments for and 
against the explanatory value of HRG, with a view to assessing what exactly is at stake in the debate. I suggest 
that the debate hinges on issues concerning the causal interpretability of regression coefficients, and concerning 
the explanatory function Hamilton’s rule is intended to serve. 
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1  Nature Red in Tooth and Claw 
In August 2010, in an incendiary Nature article entitled ‘The Evolution of Eusociality’ 
([2010]), the Harvard sociobiologists Martin A. Nowak, Corina E. Tarnita and Edward O. 
Wilson unleashed a savage critique of the best known and most widely used framework for 
the study of social evolution, W. D. Hamilton’s ([1964], [1970]) theory of kin selection. The 
article sparked a ferocious controversy. In March 2011, Nature published five rebuttals1, one 
of which remarked in no uncertain terms that Nowak and colleagues’ arguments ‘are based 
on a misunderstanding of evolutionary theory, and a misrepresentation of the empirical 
literature’ (Abbot et al. [2011], p. E1). The letter was signed by 137 social evolution theorists. 
Further rebuttals have followed2, but Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson remain unmoved. In an 
online statement dated June 2011, they write:  
Some of the criticism distorts our arguments, which should 
remain clear. We therefore provide a brief summary of our main 
points, all of which stand unrefuted... (Nowak et al. [2011b]) 
In this paper, I want to deconstruct this rather acrimonious debate. I want to suggest why it 
has reached the present state of deadlock, and how the deadlock might nevertheless be 
broken.  
                                                           
1
 (Abbot et al. [2011]; Boomsma et al. [2011]; Strassmann et al. [2011]; Ferriere and Michod [2011]; Herre and 
Wcislo [2011]); see (Nowak et al. [2011a]) for the authors’ uncompromising reply. 
2
 See, e.g., (Rousset and Lion [2011]; Gardner et al. [2011]; Bourke [2011a]). Not all responses, however, have 
been negative: see, e.g., (Doebeli [2010]; van Veelen et al. [2010]).  
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I will focus on what I take to be the core disagreement between Nowak, Tarnita and 
Wilson and their opponents. The disagreement concerns Hamilton’s rule.3 The rule states, 
broadly speaking, that a social behaviour will be favoured by natural selection if and only if 
0rb c− > , where b represents the ‘benefit’ the behaviour confers on the recipient, c 
represents the ‘cost’ it imposes on the actor, and r represents the ‘relatedness’ between actors 
and recipients. Note that, although talk of ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ intuitively connotes that costs 
will detract from an agent’s fitness while benefits increase it, this need not be the case: the 
rule is intended to apply regardless of the sign of b or c. Hence, while the rule is most often 
associated with the evolution of cooperation (for which b is positive) and the evolution of 
altruism (for which b and c are both positive), selfish, spiteful and mutualistic behaviours are 
also intended to fall within the scope of Hamilton’s rule (see Hamilton [1964]; Trivers 
[1985]; Bourke and Franks [1995]; West et al. [2007]; Bourke [2011b]). Note also that r need 
not measure genealogical relatedness. Though Hamilton’s rule is often glossed informally in 
terms of genealogical kinship, it has long been recognized that the rule can still apply when 
genotypic or phenotypic correlations arise by other means (see, e.g., Hamilton [1975]; Grafen 
[1985]). 
Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson provocatively assert that Hamilton’s rule ‘almost never 
holds’ (Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson [2010], p. 1059), in the sense that it almost never 
constitutes a true statement of the conditions under which a social behaviour will be favoured 
by natural selection. More than any other in the paper, this claim has elicited vigorous 
                                                           
3
 The debate has other facets that I do not discuss here. For instance, I do not discuss the notion of ‘inclusive 
fitness’, its relationship to Hamilton’s rule, or the ‘organism as inclusive-fitness-maximizing agent’ analogy it is 
often thought to underwrite (Grafen [2006]). These are important issues, but I leave them for another occasion. 
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rebuttals from their opponents—most notably from the Oxford theorists Andy Gardner, Stuart 
A. West and Geoff Wild, who retort that ‘it is simply incorrect to claim that Hamilton’s rule 
requires restrictive assumptions or that it almost never holds’ (Gardner et al. [2011], p. 1038). 
There is, at present, no sign of an end to this standoff. Harvard’s most eminent social 
evolution theorists say that Hamilton’s rule ‘almost never holds’; Oxford’s most eminent 
social evolution theorists dismiss this claim as ‘simply incorrect’. It is hard to see how they 
can both be right, yet neither seems likely to budge. Is there any way to bring the two 
opposing camps together?   
Here is a conciliatory suggestion. I think that what this debate has brought to the 
surface is that there are at least two versions of Hamilton’s rule in contemporary social 
evolution theory. Though similar on the surface, these two versions differ significantly in their 
underlying features; and which version of the rule one has in mind will affect one’s views 
regarding how generally the rule holds. Failure to attend to the different versions of 
Hamilton’s rule has resulted in the Harvard and Oxford camps talking past one another. To 
make any progress in this debate, we must take greater care to distinguish them. 
.The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I characterize the two versions of 
Hamilton’s rule at issue in the current debate. The first is a ‘special’ version in which the 
‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ terms represent fecundity payoffs in an evolutionary game; the second is 
a ‘general’ version, derived from the Price equation, in which the ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ terms 
are partial regression coefficients. In Section 3, I explain why one’s views as to how 
generally Hamilton’s rule holds will depend on which version one has in mind. This leads 
naturally to the suggestion that Nowak et al. are attacking a straw man—that they show 
5 
 
Hamilton’s rule ‘almost never holds’ only by uncharitably construing it in a particularly 
narrow sense. In Section 4, however, I argue that this characterization of their argument is 
misleading: Nowak and colleagues also offer arguments against the general version of 
Hamilton’s rule—arguments which have been largely overlooked by their opponents. I 
suggest that, in light of this, their overall strategy is best interpreted as that of posing a 
dilemma for the defender of Hamilton’s rule: they argue that the special version of 
Hamilton’s rule lacks wide applicability, while the general version lacks explanatory power. 
If their arguments work, neither version of Hamilton’s rule constitutes the widely applicable 
explanatory principle its advocates take it to be. In Sections 5 and 6, I consider how defenders 
of Hamilton’s rule can respond to this challenge. The debate, I argue, ultimately turns on 
philosophical issues concerning the causal interpretability of regression coefficients, and 
concerning the explanatory function Hamilton’s rule is intended to serve. 
 
2  Two Versions of Hamilton’s Rule 
Disagreement about the uses and limits of Hamilton’s rule has been a mainstay of theoretical 
biology since the 1960s. The reason, in a nutshell, is that Hamilton ([1964]) first derived a 
result of the form ‘ 0rb c− > ’ in a one-locus population-genetic model that made a number of 
substantive modelling assumptions, including weak selection and the additivity of fitness 
effects. In the following decades, theorists (including Hamilton himself) explored the extent 
to which Hamilton’s original assumptions could be relaxed. The upshot was a variety of 
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routes to ‘ 0rb c− > ’-type results, often with incompatible implications about the conditions 
under which the result obtains.4   
Perhaps these disagreements are substantive: perhaps there is only one biologically 
significant result of the form ‘ 0rb c− > ’, and only one true statement of the conditions under 
which this inequality predicts the evolution of social behaviour. But there is another 
possibility: it may be that there is more than one biologically significant result of the form ‘
0rb c− > ’, and that the similarity in the surface form of these results masks underlying 
differences in their biological meaning. If this is correct, the appearance of disagreement over 
the uses and limits of ‘Hamilton’s rule’ may arise simply from a failure to disambiguate 
different versions of the rule.  
I want to explore this second possibility. For I contend that the method one uses to 
derive ‘Hamilton’s rule’ will often have a significant impact on the meaning one attaches to 
its terms; the result is that talk of ‘Hamilton’s rule’ ambiguously refers to any of a number of 
superficially similar principles. In this section, I illustrate this phenomenon by considering 
two routes to Hamilton’s rule in contemporary evolutionary theory: a route that proceeds via 
evolutionary game theory, and a route that proceeds via George R. Price’s ([1970], [1972]) 
covariance selection mathematics. I show that, while both methods may be used to derive a 
result with the surface form of Hamilton’s rule, the meaning attached to the terms is very 
different in the two cases. The rationale for picking out these two derivations, rather than any 
others in the literature, is that understanding the difference between the versions of 
                                                           
4
 See, e.g, (Hamilton [1970], [1972], [1975]; Orlove [1975]; Charnov [1977]; Charlesworth [1980]; Uyenoyama 
and Feldman [1980], [1981], [1982]; Uyenoyama et al. [1981]; Michod [1982]; Toro et al. [1982]; Grafen 
[1985]). 
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Hamilton’s rule they yield is crucial if we want to understand the present Harvard/Oxford 
standoff. 
The key conceptual difference between the two versions may be simply expressed. 
One construes the B, C and R terms as parameters of an evolutionary game, and represents a 
condition for the evolution of a social behaviour within a very restricted class of populations. 
The other construes b, c and r as linear regression coefficients, and represents a highly 
general condition under which a social behaviour will be favoured by natural selection. 
Hence, although the two rules have the same surface form, their terms are defined in very 
different ways; and it is vital that we understand these differences if we want to make sense 
of the current debate. At bottom, the dispute concerns what we have to sacrifice in return for 
the generality afforded by the second, more widely applicable version of Hamilton’s rule—
and whether the price is worth paying. 
 
2.1 The special version (HRS) 
The game-theoretic route5 to a version of Hamilton’s rule begins with a simple evolutionary 
game: the one-shot, two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma.6 We can represent the dilemma with the 
following payoff matrix, in which B is a benefit conferred on the recipient by the social 
behaviour under study, and C is a cost incurred by the actor: 
                                                           
5
 The order in which I present the two routes is arbitrary: it is not intended to imply that either version has 
historical or explanatory priority. 
6
 See, e.g., (Queller [1984]; Nowak [2006]; Taylor and Nowak [2007]; Okasha [2008]; van Veelen [2009]; van 
Veelen et al. [2012]) for variants of this route to Hamilton’s rule. 
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 COOPERATE (Co2) DEFECT (De2) 
COOPERATE (Co1) B – C - C 
DEFECT (De1) B 0 
 
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Pareto optimal outcome is mutual cooperation. Unfortunately, 
in the absence of correlated interactions, DEFECT will always secure a higher expected 
payoff whenever COOPERATE is costly to perform. To see this, note that the expected 
payoff for cooperation (
Co
W ) and defection (
De
W ) may be written as functions of B, C and the 
conditional probability that one’s opponent will cooperate: 
 
 
 
Uncorrelated interactions implies that ( ) ( )2 1 2 1 CP Co |Co   P Co |De  f= = , where Cf is the 
overall frequency of cooperators in the population. From this assumption it follows that: 
 
 
 
Co De
 iff 0W W C> <
( )
( )
Co 2 1
De 2 1
 P Co |Co –
 P Co |De
W B C
W B
=
=
9 
 
Since, by definition, an altruistic behaviour imposes a non-negative cost on the actor, the 
implication is that altruism cannot evolve in a one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma with 
uncorrelated interactions. This is one way of conceptualizing the ‘problem of cooperation’ 
within the framework of evolutionary game theory (see, e.g., Nowak [2006]; Nowak and 
Highfield [2011]). 
The picture changes when we introduce correlated interactions: that is, when we raise 
the probability that cooperators will interact with other cooperators, and that defectors will 
interact with other defectors.7 We can express this formally by adding an R-term to our 
expressions for the relevant conditional probabilities, where R is a parameter that specifies 
the differential probability that one’s opponent will play the same strategy as oneself: 
 
 
  
By plugging these new expressions into the payoff functions that determine the values of
Co
W
and
De
W , we obtain a new, rather more promising condition for the evolution of cooperation: 
 
 
  
                                                           
7
 See (Skyrms [1996]) for broader discussion of how evolutionary games are transformed by the introduction of 
correlated interactions. 
Co De
  iff – 0W W RB C> >(HRS)
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 1 Co
2 1 Co
P Co |Co   1 –
P Co |De   1 –
R f R
R f
= +
=
10 
 
In essence, the condition states that altruism can evolve in a one-shot, two-player Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, provided the differential probability that an altruist has of interacting with another 
altruist exceeds the cost-benefit ratio. For reasons that will soon become clear, I will refer to 
this as the special version of Hamilton’s rule (HRS).  
  
2.2 The general version (HRG) 
The second route to a principle with the form of Hamilton’s rule begins with the Price 
equation, a fully general but highly abstract description of evolutionary change:8 
 
 
 
The equation states that the overall change in the additive genetic value9 of a trait, g, from 
one generation to the next is equal to the sum of two quantities: the normalized covariance 
between g and fitness (w), and the fitness-weighted expectation of the change in g between a 
                                                           
8
 Hamilton ([1970]) was the first to see the relevance of the Price equation to kin selection theory. The 
derivation of Hamilton’s rule I present here, however, is owed originally to Queller ([1992a]). For similar 
derivations that proceed via the Price equation, see (Grafen [1985]; Frank [1998]; Gardner et al. [2007]; Gardner 
[2008]; Gardner and Foster [2008]; Wenseleers et al. [2010]; Gardner et al. [2011]; Marshall [2011a]; Queller 
[2011]; Damore and Gore [2012]). 
9
 An individual’s ‘additive genetic value’ (or ‘breeding value’) for a particular character is its value for that 
character as predicted by a linear combination of its alleles, weighted by their average effects on the character 
(see Queller [1992a], [1992b]; Falconer and Mackay [1996]; Gardner et al. [2007]; Gardner et al. [2011] for 
further detail). If a behaviour is fully determined by the presence or absence of a single social allele, the additive 
genetic value with respect to this behaviour is 1 for bearers of the allele and 0 otherwise. In this special case, 
g∆
 is simply the overall change in the frequency of this allele.  
( ) ( )1 Cov , Eg w g w g
w
 ∆ = + ∆ 
11 
 
parent and its offspring (I will not derive the equation here; see Price [1970], [1972]; Frank 
[1995], [1998], [2012]; Rice [2004]; Okasha [2006]; Gardner [2008]).   
The terms in the Price equation are often given an informal causal gloss: ( )Cov ,w g is 
usually interpreted as the partial change attributable to natural selection, while ( )E w g∆ is 
interpreted as the partial change attributable to biased transmission (see Frank [1995], [1998], 
[2012]; Gardner [2008]; for criticism of this gloss, see Okasha [2006]). The route from the 
Price equation to a version of Hamilton’s rule begins by leaving aside the second term, so as 
to focus purely on the partial change attributable to natural selection (
s
g∆ ):10 
 
 
  
To derive a version of Hamilton’s rule, we partition this covariance term into two 
components: one corresponding to rb, the other to –c.11 The first step is to write a linear 
regression model for the fitness of an arbitrary individual. This expresses its fitness as a linear 
function of its own genetic value ( g ) and the average genetic value of its social partners ( g′
                                                           
10
 See, e.g., (Queller [1992a]; Gardner et al. [2011]). Frank ([1998]) derives a variant of Hamilton’s rule that 
takes into account the effect of biased transmission, but this rule lacks the famous ‘ 0rb c− > ’ form. 
11
 The general strategy of partitioning the overall covariance between genotype and fitness is also central to 
multi-level selection theory (Okasha [2006]). There is a particularly strong affinity between the regression route 
to Hamilton’s rule and the ‘contextual analysis’ approach to multi-level selection (Heisler and Damuth [1987]; 
Damuth and Heisler [1988]). Both partition the Price equation through regression analysis; the major difference 
is that, while kin selection includes the genotype of an individual’s social partner among the predictors in the 
regression model, contextual analysis considers properties of the whole group of which the individual is a 
member.  
( )1 Cov ,s g w gw  ∆ =  
12 
 
), in which each quantity is weighted by a partial regression coefficient (for example, 
, .w g g
β
′
 
represents the partial regression of w on g, correcting for g'):12 
 
 
 
The α -term is a constant, and denotes the intercept of the regression line. The residual, ε, 
quantifies the extent to which the focal individual’s fitness deviates from the regression line. 
It is important to see that, because the regression equation includes a residual term, it is 
compatible with any set of population data.13 Naturally, the regression line will fit some 
populations better than others (i.e., with smaller residuals), but there can be no individual, 
real or modelled, of which the equation is false. 
 We then substitute the linear regression equation into the Price equation, obtaining the 
following rather unwieldy partition:  
 
 
 
                                                           
12This can be visualized intuitively as the slope of the line of best fit when one plots w  against g while ‘holding 
fixed’ g′ . Note, however, that we are not literally ‘holding fixed’ anything: we are correcting for a correlated 
variable by statistical means, in order to minimize the sum-of-squares of residuals in the regression model as a 
whole (for further detail, see Lande and Arnold [1983]).  
13
 A proviso: the partial regression coefficients are defined only if (i) there is non-zero variance in both predictor 
variables and (ii) the two predictor variables are not perfectly collinear. These are fairly minimal conditions, and 
it is reasonable to assume that they will be met in a very wide range of cases. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), . , .1 Cov , Var Cov , Cov ,s w g g w g gg g g g g gw α β β ε′ ′ ′∆ = + + + 
, . , .w g g w g gw g gα β β ε′ ′ ′= + + +
13 
 
We can simplify this partition by noting firstly that g cannot co-vary with the intercept of the 
regression line (i.e., ( )Cov ,   0g α = ), and secondly that it cannot (given standard least-
squares theory) co-vary with the residuals in the regression model (i.e., ( )Cov ,  = 0g ε ):14 
 
 
 
We then rearrange, and exploit the fact that ( ) ( ) '.Cov , ' / Var  g gg g g β= , to obtain the 
following expression: 
 
 
 
Finally, we exploit the fact that neither w  nor ( )Var g  can be negative to obtain the 
following rule:  
 
 
 
This result already has the form of Hamilton’s rule. By re-labelling the regression coefficients 
as – c, b and r respectively, and by swapping the order in which the terms appear, we obtain 
the rule in a more familiar guise:15 
                                                           
14
 Note that the covariance between g and itself is simply the variance in g (i.e., ( ) ( )Cov ,   Varg g g= ). 
15
 This is the ‘direct fitness’ route to Hamilton’s rule; a very similar result may be obtained by considering the 
effects of a behaviour on the actor’s ‘inclusive fitness’ (see Frank [1998]; Gardner et al. [2011]; Queller [2011]). 
I use the ‘direct fitness’ derivation because the ‘inclusive fitness’ derivation adds some complications which are 
unnecessary for the purposes of this paper. 
( ) ( ), . , .Var Cov ,s w g g w g gg g g gβ β′ ′ ′∆ = +
( ) ( ), . , . ,1 Vars w g g w g g g gg gw β β β′ ′ ′ ∆ = + ⋅ ⋅ 
, . , . ,
0 iff 0s w g g w g g g gg β β β′ ′ ′∆ > + ⋅ >
14 
 
 
 
 
I will refer to this as the general version of Hamilton’s rule (HRG). As in the case of HRS, 
the reasons for this label will soon become clear. 
 
2.3 The rules compared 
Let us review. The special version of Hamilton’s rule, HRS, is a game-theoretic result 
derived in the context of a two-player, one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma with correlated 
interactions. The C and B terms are fecundity payoffs, while R is a further parameter that 
determines the differential probability that social partners play the same strategy. By contrast, 
HRG has no essential ties to evolutionary game theory. In HRG, the b and c terms are partial 
regression coefficients that quantify the overall statistical dependence of one’s fitness on, 
respectively, one’s own genotype and that of one’s social partners; while r is the simple 
regression of one’s social partners’ average genetic value on one’s own genetic value.16 In 
deriving HRG, we made no substantial assumptions about the population or model under 
study. All we needed were two equations—the Price equation and a linear regression 
                                                           
16
 If each agent’s strategy is fully determined by its additive genetic value, then, in the one-shot, two-player 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the regression of one’s partner’s genetic value on one’s own genetic value is equal to the 
R-parameter, i.e., r = R. Importantly, however, the two notions are conceptually distinct despite their numerical 
equality in this particular case. R is a model parameter that determines an aspect of population structure, 
whereas r is a population statistic that measures the overall association between the genotypes of social partners.  
   0 iff 0
s
g rb c∆ > − >(HRG)
15 
 
equation—which are true of virtually any evolving population, whether real or modelled, and 
from which HRG follows a priori.  
 
3  How They Come Apart: A Simple Illustration 
The differences between HRS and HRG are not merely superficial: they have significant 
implications regarding the conditions under which the two rules hold. This makes the 
distinction crucial for understanding the current debate. For when Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson 
assert that Hamilton’s rule ‘almost never holds’ ([2010], p. 1059), it is clear from the way in 
which they formalize their arguments that HRS, not HRG, is the version of Hamilton’s rule 
they have in mind. Meanwhile, when Gardner, West and Wild reply that ‘it is simply 
incorrect to claim that Hamilton’s rule requires restrictive assumptions or that it almost never 
holds’ ([2011], p. 1038), it is equally clear from the way in which they formalize their 
arguments that HRG, not HRS, is the version of Hamilton’s rule they have in mind. Once we 
disambiguate the two superficially similar versions of Hamilton’s rule, we are free to 
acknowledge both points: it is correct that HRS holds only in a very limited range of cases, 
but it is also correct that HRG holds extremely generally. This is why it is fitting to describe 
the two versions as, respectively, the ‘special’ and ‘general’ versions of Hamilton’s rule. 
 
3.1 Why HRS often fails  
For a simple example of the limitations of HRS, we can return to the two-player, one-shot 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and add a new payoff to the top-left box in the payoff matrix, denoted by 
16 
 
the letter D (see Queller [1984], [1985]; van Veelen [2009]; van Veelen et al. [2012]). D 
represents a synergistic payoff, a payoff that obtains only if both players cooperate:  
 
 COOPERATE (Co2) DEFECT (De2) 
COOPERATE (Co2) B - C + D - C 
DEFECT (De2) B 0 
 
D may be positive (perhaps representing a bonus payoff for cooperators that work together to 
achieve feats they could not achieve alone) or negative (perhaps representing diminishing 
returns caused by cooperators getting in each other’s way). Either way, the size and 
magnitude of the D-payoff will plainly matter to the direction of evolution: for instance, if D 
is large and negative, cooperation could be much harder to evolve than it would be otherwise 
be; while, if D is large and positive, cooperation could evolve much more easily than it 
otherwise would. The upshot is that the condition for 
Co
W > 
De
W is no longer given by 
0RB C− >  (i.e., HRS), for this version of Hamilton’s rule takes no account of the D-payoff. 
As Queller ([1984], [1985]) shows, the true condition for the evolution of cooperation in this 
game (henceforth: the ‘synergy game’) depends not merely on R, B, and C, but also on D and
Co
f , the frequency of cooperators:17 
 
                                                           
17
 See (Queller [1984], [1985], [1992b], [2011]). The modified condition is sometimes known as ‘Queller’s rule’ 
(see, e.g., Marshall [2011b]). 
17 
 
  
  
Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson ([2010]) discuss a variety of more complicated cases in 
which HRS fails. It is hardly surprising, however, that HRS should fail in more complex 
cases, given that it fails even in very simple synergy games. In recent work, Matthijs van 
Veelen and colleagues (van Veelen [2009]; van Veelen et al. [2012]) show that the failure of 
HRS in the synergy game is merely one instance of a very general problem for HRS: HRS 
holds only if the difference between one’s payoffs is independent of the strategy one’s 
opponent plays, a condition sometimes called Equal Gains from Switching (EGS):18 
 
(EGS) (top left – bottom left) = (top right – bottom right) 
 
When EGS holds, the
Co
f  and 
De
f  terms cancel when one subtracts 
De
W from
Co
W , 
leaving behind a simple inequality in terms of R, B and C. Crucially, however, EGS is likely 
to fail whenever there are non-additive fitness effects: that is, whenever an interaction 
between organisms produces a fitness effect that is more than a mere sum of the effects that 
each organism’s individual behaviour, taken in isolation, would have had. There is no reason 
to suppose that non-additive effects of this nature are uncommon in nature. On the contrary, 
they are known to be widespread in insect societies (Anderson and McShea [2001]; Anderson 
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 For further discussion of Equal Gains from Switching, see (Nowak and Sigmund [1990]; Traulsen and Wild 
[2007]; van Veelen [2009]; van Veelen et al. [2012]). 
( )( )Co De  iff –  1 – 0CoW W RB C R f R D> + + >
18 
 
and Franks [2001]; Anderson et al. [2001]) and in colonies of social microbes (Damore and 
Gore [2012]; Cornforth et al. [2012])). As a result, there is no reason to suppose that EGS 
applies generally or even particularly widely to real instances of social interaction.  
 
3.2 Why HRG always holds 
The same is not true of HRG. In recent work, Andy Gardner and colleagues (Gardner et al. 
[2007]; Gardner et al. [2011]) have shown that, when one construes Hamilton’s rule as HRG, 
the rule still holds in games with fitness effects that depend non-additively on individual 
behaviours. In the case of the simple synergy game introduced above, all that happens is that 
the b and c coefficients in HRG come apart from the B and C payoffs in the payoff matrix, 
and now also depend on D, R, and 
Co
f : 
 
 
 
 
HRG holds where HRS fails because, unlike HRS, it takes the D-payoff into 
consideration. It does so by means of a ‘correction factor’ in the cost and benefit coefficients: 
we account for synergy not as a third, separate predictor of the direction of evolution, distinct 
from c and b, but rather as a phenomenon that (if positive) lessens the average cost of 
cooperation and boosts its average benefit. The size of the correction factor depends on the 
( )( )
( )( )
Co
Co
1
1
1
1
1
1
b B R R f D
R
c C R R f D
R
= + + −
+
= − + −
+
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differential probability a cooperator has of receiving the synergistic payoff, and this 
probability is a function of R, the parameter that sets the differential probability of social 
partners playing identical strategies, and of
Co
f , the overall frequency of cooperation in the 
population. 
Although we should undoubtedly applaud Gardner and colleagues for showing 
exactly how HRG applies in the synergy game, it is important to see that HRG cannot fail to 
hold in any (real or modelled) system to which the Price equation applies, because it is 
simply an a priori implication of the Price equation and a linear regression model. Since the 
Price equation will still hold even when individuals interact in very complex ways, and since 
a linear regression model can be fitted to any set of population data19, HRG will still hold in 
these cases. No matter how far we get from additive, pairwise interactions, we know that 
HRG cannot possibly fail unless the Price equation also fails. 
 
4  A Dilemma for Hamilton’s Defenders 
It would be all too easy, at this point, to draw on the HRS/HRG distinction to accuse Nowak 
and colleagues of attacking a straw man. On the face of it, it seems that they are able to argue 
that Hamilton’s rule ‘almost never holds’ only because they are construing Hamilton’s rule in 
a particularly narrow sense (viz., as HRS). If they were to construe Hamilton’s rule as many 
of their opponents do (viz., as HRG), then the basis for their criticisms would vanish.  
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 Subject to the proviso in footnote 13. 
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This, roughly speaking, is the response pressed by Gardner et al. ([2011]) (there is 
also a hint of this response in Abbot et al. [2011]). Nowak and his allies, however, 
maintain—not without some justification—that this response misunderstands the structure of 
their argument (see Nowak et al. [2011a]). For they reply that a retreat to HRG amounts to no 
more than a hollow victory for the kin selection theorist, on the basis that HRG is incapable 
of bearing the explanatory weight kin selection theorists expect it to carry: 
Hamilton’s rule states that cooperation can evolve if relatedness 
exceeds the cost to benefit ratio. If cost and benefit are 
parameters of individual actions [HRS] then this rule almost 
never holds. There are attempts to make Hamilton’s rule work 
by choosing generalized cost and benefit parameters [HRG], but 
these parameters are no longer properties of individual 
phenotypes. They depend on the entire system including 
population structure. These extended versions of Hamilton’s 
rule have no explanatory power for theory or experiment. 
(Nowak et al. [2011a])  
A related (though subtly different) complaint surfaces in Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson’s online 
statement of June 2011: 
There exist generalized versions of Hamilton's rule that are 
designed to be ‘always true’ [HRG], but they are empty 
statements, which provide no insight for theory or experiment. 
(Nowak et al. [2011b])  
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Though one might be tempted to dismiss these replies as an ad hoc response to an unexpected 
barrage of criticism, this would not be fair: Nowak and his allies have been making arguments 
along these lines for some time. Indeed, Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson make a very similar 
argument against HRG in the supplementary material of their original article20: 
[W]hen realizing that the usual [ 0RB C− > ] rule [HRS] does 
not hold for a given model, Gardner et al (2007) propose that a 
modified rule [ 0rb c− > ]  in fact holds, where [r] is [equal to] 
the usual relatedness but [b] and [c] are the ‘effective’ costs and 
benefits calculated using statistical methods [HRG] ... these 
effective costs and benefits unfortunately are very confusing and 
are typically functions of not only [B] and [C] but also of the 
relatedness R. Hence Hamilton’s rule becomes [
( ) ( )b c 0R R R− >  ], which makes it very complicated to 
separate any effects and it generally provides no intuition 
whatsoever. (Nowak et al. [2010], p. 18 (supplementary 
information))  
It seems a little uncharitable, in light of these quotations, to accuse Nowak et al. of attacking 
a straw man. Rather, I suggest that Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson’s case against Hamilton’s rule 
is most charitably interpreted as presenting a dilemma for the kin selection theorist. The 
thought is that, however one prefers to interpret the ‘cost’, ‘benefit’ and ‘relatedness’ terms in 
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 I have made several alterations to the quotation to bring Nowak and colleagues’ notation into line with my 
own. These do not affect the meaning of the quoted passage. 
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Hamilton’s rule, the resultant principle is supposed to be both widely applicable and 
explanatorily powerful. Nowak and colleagues’ argument is that: 
(i) HRS is not widely applicable. 
(ii) HRG has no explanatory power. 
If they are right, then neither formulation satisfies both desiderata. Hamilton’s rule—
whichever formulation one prefers—is not the widely applicable explanatory principle that 
kin selection theorists take it to be.21 
Do they have a case? For the reasons given in Section 3, the suggestion that HRS is 
not widely applicable seems entirely reasonable. But the claim that HRG buys its generality at 
the expense of explanatory power is more contentious—and Nowak and colleagues’ argument 
for this claim is stated rather too briefly to be persuasive as it stands. They assert that HRG 
‘provides no intuition whatsoever’, because the b and c coefficients ‘are no longer properties 
of individual phenotypes’ but instead ‘depend on the entire system including population 
structure’; but the reasoning behind this assertion remains frustratingly opaque. In what sense 
are b and c ‘no longer properties of individual phenotypes’? And in what sense does this 
result in them providing ‘no intuition whatsoever’? In the remainder of the paper, I want to 
examine Nowak and colleagues’ case against HRG in greater detail. To this end, it will be 
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 One possible response to Nowak and colleagues’ ‘dilemma’ would be to argue that a third version of 
Hamilton’s rule, distinct from both HRS and HRG, can satisfy both desiderata. Though I leave open the 
possibility of a ‘third way’ between HRS and HRG, I do not think any extant variants of Hamilton’s rule can do 
this job. For instance, Hamilton’s original ([1964]) route to Hamilton’s rule—not discussed here—invokes 
similar assumptions to HRS, including the assumptions of weak selection and additive fitness effects. Many 
other derivations require similar assumptions. 
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helpful to disentangle two separate strands of criticism that have surfaced in the recent debate, 
and which Nowak et al. run together in the above quotations: 
a) HRG has no explanatory power because it is ‘always true’.  
b) HRG has no explanatory power because the cost and benefit terms do 
not represent ‘properties of individual phenotypes’.  
These criticisms are quite distinct. Both, however, are somewhat obscure at first glance; and 
both must be explicated with care before we can see how the defender of HRG might 
respond. In the next two sections, I consider each in turn. 
 
5  HRG and Explanatory Power I: The ‘Tautology Problem’ Redux 
On several occasions, Nowak and his allies have expressed the concern that the derivation of 
HRG is a kind of black magic—that the rule appears from nowhere, pulled out of the Price 
equation like a rabbit from a hat.22  This concern is not unreasonable. The Price equation is, 
after all, a highly abstract mathematical theorem which makes very few assumptions about 
the population it describes, and which tells us nothing at all about the conditions under which 
a social behaviour will be favoured by natural selection other than that it will be favoured 
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 See, e.g., (Nowak and Highfield [2011]): ‘answers do indeed seem to pop out of the equation, like rabbits 
from a magician’s hat’ (p. 101); ‘I found that the mathematical methods of kin selection were often murky. ... 
Equations seemed to arise out of nowhere in kin selection’ (p. 104). As Nowak and Highfield note, the 
suggestion that results emerge from Price’s formalism ‘like rabbits from a hat’ was first made by Hamilton 
himself, though not in any disparaging sense (see Hamilton [1996], p. 172). 
24 
 
when its breeding value co-varies positively with fitness.23 For this reason, the equation is 
often described as a ‘mathematical tautology’, even by its foremost proponents (see, e.g., 
Frank [1995], [2012]; Okasha [2006]). To get from the Price equation to HRG, we need only 
substitute in a regression model which, owing to the residual term, is compatible with any 
possible set of population data. In effect, therefore, we start with two mathematical 
tautologies; and yet, by substituting one into the other, we arrive at a principle that is afforded 
huge explanatory significance by both theorists and experimentalists. Nowak and colleagues’ 
concern can thus be expressed as follows: if the ingredients from which it is derived are 
merely mathematical tautologies, how can Hamilton’s rule nevertheless carry the explanatory 
weight it is expected to carry? How can it tell us anything empirically informative about the 
ecological conditions for social evolution, if the equations from which it is derived do not?  
 This complaint against HRG has echoes of something much older. In the early days 
of the field, philosophers of biology were vexed by the so-called ‘tautology problem’: the 
charge that evolutionary theory is explanatorily empty because the phrase ‘survival of the 
fittest’ is a tautology. The phrase claims that the ‘fittest’ organisms survive, but the ‘fittest’ 
are (supposedly) defined as the organisms that survive; the phrase therefore tells us nothing 
about the evolutionary process that we could not have grasped simply by understanding the 
concepts it contains. While the alleged problem stimulated important work on the nature of 
fitness (e.g., Mills and Beatty [1979], Rosenberg [1983]; Sober [1984]), it is, in hindsight, 
rather hard to take seriously, firstly because fitness is not normally defined in terms of 
survival alone, and secondly because the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ carries no serious 
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 van Veelen et al. ([2012]) compare this to Johan Cruyff’s famous tactical advice: to win a game of football, 
you need to score more goals than your opponent. 
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explanatory weight in evolutionary theory (Dawkins [1982]). The nature of Nowak and 
colleagues’ first complaint against HRG is, in some ways, strikingly similar. The difference, 
of course, is that the stakes are much higher. For Hamilton’s rule, unlike ‘survival of the 
fittest’, is undoubtedly expected to carry serious explanatory weight. 
How, then, can the defender of HRG respond to this new ‘tautology’ complaint? It 
will be instructive to consider one natural response which does not succeed. This is to argue 
that, although HRG is indeed an a priori implication of the Price equation and a linear 
regression model, all modelling results are in some sense a priori—so the explanatory power 
of the rule cannot be undermined by its a priority unless all modelling results are similarly 
undermined. This response, reasonable as it may sound on first hearing, fails to grasp an 
important difference between HRG and most other important modelling results in theoretical 
biology. For while it is true that modelling work often generates results that are arguably a 
priori, these are usually conditional results of the form: if some substantive modelling 
assumptions obtain, then this outcome follows. It is never a priori that a model will succeed in 
describing any actual evolutionary process, because it is never a priori that any actual 
evolutionary process will satisfy the antecedent of the conditional.24 HRG is unusual not in 
that it is a priori, but in that it is a priori true of any possible evolutionary change, whether real 
or modelled, by virtue of the definitions of the terms involved. This is the sense in which it is 
‘tautologous’, or ‘always true’; and it is this combination of a priority and unconditional 
descriptive content that sets HRG apart from conditional results obtained within concrete 
models of particular scenarios. The question at issue, then, is this: how can a claim that is a 
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 van Veelen et al. ([2012]) make a similar point. See also (Sober [2011], Lange and Rosenberg [2011]) for 
discussion of this issue. 
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priori true of any possible evolutionary change—regardless of the nature of the entities in 
question, and regardless of how they interact with one another—tell us anything empirically 
informative about the evolution of social behaviour? The concern is that, because HRG fits 
everything, it explains nothing. 
For a more promising line of response, we can begin by making explicit a point that 
is, I suspect, often simply taken for granted in discussions of HRG. This is that, in at least 
some circumstances, the partial regression of Y on X may be interpretable as a measure of the 
causal effect of X on Y.25 Figure 1 shows how a causal interpretation of this sort might apply 
to the regression model we used to derive HRG. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If a particular regression model admits of a causal interpretation, then substituting that 
equation into the Price equation allows us to decompose the overall w-g covariance into 
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 Why talk of ‘causal effects’ rather than simply ‘effects’? The reason is that Fisher ([1930], [1941]) makes 
heavy use of the notion of the ‘average effect’ of a gene substitution on a phenotypic character, which he defines 
stipulatively as the partial regression of phenotypic value on allelic dosage, correcting for other alleles. Strictly 
speaking, this is a statistical notion rather than a causal one, so Fisher’s choice of terminology is unfortunate. In 
talking of ‘causal effects’, I am referring specifically to partial regression coefficients interpreted causally. 
Figure 1. The causal interpretation of a linear regression model. 
Fitness of an 
arbitrary individual 
Causal effect  
of g on w 
, . , .w g g w g gw g gα β β ε′ ′ ′= + + +
Causal effect  
of g′ on w 
Residual  
fitness 
27 
 
separate causal components, each attributable to a distinct influence on fitness (see Frank 
[1998]; Okasha [2006]). In this way, partitioning the Price equation adds causal content: the 
partition entails claims about the causes of evolutionary change that the Price equation alone 
does not entail. Figure 2 shows the particular partition we used to derive HRG, together with 
its causal interpretation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By rearranging this expression following the procedure outlined in Section 2.2, while holding 
the causal interpretations of the relevant coefficients in place, we can derive a causal 
interpretation of HRG (Figure 3). Verbally, the causal interpretation of HRG states that 
selection will act to increase the population mean of g iff the causal effect of g on w, plus the 
relatedness-weighted causal effect of g' on w, exceeds zero. Thus interpreted, HRG embodies 
a substantive claim about the causal conditions for the evolution of social behaviour that the 
Price equation alone does not entail. 
 
Figure 2. The causal interpretation of the kin selection partition 
of the Price equation, derived in Section 2.2. 
Change directly 
attributable to  
natural selection 
Causal effect  
of g on w 
Causal effect  
of g′ on w 
( ) ( ), . , .1 Var Cov ,s w g g w g gg g g g
w
β β
′ ′
 ′∆ = + 
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To see how this bears on our ‘tautology problem’, it is crucial to note that regression 
coefficients are only sometimes causally interpretable. They are not always so interpretable: 
to think otherwise is to suppose that we can simply read off causation from measures of 
statistical association (Okasha [2006]).26 Roughly speaking, the coefficients in a regression 
analysis of fitness will only admit of a causal interpretation if the predictors in the regression 
equation exhaustively account for the causal pathways through which fitness is influenced by 
genotype: if multiple pathways are conflated within the same term, or if some pathways are 
omitted altogether, regression coefficients will partly reflect spurious correlations rather than 
genuine causal influence (cf. Spirtes et al. [2000]). I revisit this point in Section 6.4, when I 
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 Note, for example, that coefficients of relatedness do not normally admit of a causal interpretation, because 
correlations between the genotypes of social partners are not normally due to the causal influence of one 
genotype over the other. Such correlation usually arises from a common cause that affects both genotypes (i.e., 
descent from a common ancestor). 
Causal effect  
of g on w 
Causal effect  
of g′ on w 
Figure 3. The causal interpretation of HRG. 
Change directly 
attributable to  
natural selection 
Coefficient of 
relatedness 
0 iff 0
s
g rb c∆ > − >
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consider in greater detail some of the conditions under which regression coefficients do and 
do not support a causal interpretation. For now, I merely want to draw attention to the fact 
that, since they are not always causally interpretable, a causal interpretation of a partition of 
the Price equation is not always true. The partition itself may hold for all possible 
populations, but the causal interpretation of that partition will not.  
This allows us to see why the ‘tautology’ complaint misses its target. For I submit 
that, when theorists invoke HRG to do explanatory work, they are most charitably construed 
as invoking not merely HRG as a bare mathematical theorem, but rather the interpretation of 
that theorem in terms of causal effects. In Sections 2 and 3, we saw the importance of 
distinguishing between HRS and HRG in discussions of the explanatory scope of Hamilton’s 
rule. It is no less important, I submit, to distinguish HRG-qua-mathematical-theorem from 
HRG-qua-explanatory-principle. When HRG is invoked qua explanatory principle, it is 
implicitly assumed that the b and c coefficients admit of a causal interpretation in terms of 
causal effects. The consequence is that HRG-qua-explanatory-principle is no tautology. For 
the b and c coefficients do not always admit of a causal interpretation, and we cannot know a 
priori whether, in any given context, the conditions for causal interpretability are satisfied (cf. 
Section 6.4). 
 
6  HRG and Explanatory Power II: Prediction versus Unification 
The tautology complaint misfires, then, because it does not distinguish HRG’s mathematical 
representation from its causal interpretation. The causal interpretation carries the explanatory 
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weight, and it is not tautologous. As the quotations we considered in Section 3 make plain, 
however, this is not the only reservation Nowak and colleagues have about HRG. There is a 
further worry: the worry that HRG is explanatorily empty because the cost and benefit terms 
do not denote ‘properties of individual phenotypes’ (Nowak et al. [2011a]). In this section, I 
reconstruct and evaluate this second strand of criticism. 
 
6.1 The predictive limitations of HRG 
To understand Nowak and colleagues’ second complaint, we can return to the synergy game 
introduced in Section 3. Recall that, when we add a D-payoff to the payoff matrix, HRG still 
holds, but the b and c regression coefficients are not simply functions of the B and C payoffs 
in the payoff matrix, but also functions of D, R and the frequency of cooperation,
Co
f . This is 
a clear illustration of what Nowak et al. have in mind when they talk of the b and c 
coefficients turning out to depend, in many cases, on ‘the entire system including population 
structure’. R, which sets the differential probability that social partners will play identical 
strategies, is an aspect of population structure; and 
Co
f is similarly a property of the 
population as a whole. 
 There can therefore be no doubt that, by defining the b and c terms in Hamilton’s rule 
as partial regression coefficients—and thereby allowing them to float free of the B and C 
payoffs in the payoff matrix—we achieve a high level of generality in return for some 
potentially rather complicated and counterintuitive relationships between the coefficients in 
Hamilton’s rule and the parameters of the model—or real population—to which we are 
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applying it. Gardner et al. ([2007]) openly concede that this is the price we have to pay for 
generality; but they evidently believe it to be a price worth paying. Here, they are plainly at 
odds with Nowak et al. ([2010]), for whom the counterintuitive relationships between the 
terms in HRG and the underlying parameters strip HRG of all explanatory value. 
 Who is correct here? One can certainly make a reasonable argument that, when b and c 
depend on population structure, HRG fails to license the sort of predictions one might 
intuitively expect Hamilton’s rule to license. For example, one might expect Hamilton’s rule 
to license the prediction that, in any given model, intervening on the parameters in such a 
way as to increase the relatedness, r, between actors and recipients would make the evolution 
of cooperation more likely.27 In fact, HRG underwrites no such prediction. This is because, 
when the r, b and c coefficients in HRG are all functions of the same parameter28, it is quite 
possible that intervening to increase r will make the evolution of cooperation less likely, , as 
our intervention may also have the effect of increasing c and decreasing b. It is even possible 
that rb c−  will be greater than zero prior to the intervention to increase r, yet less than zero 
afterwards, as a direct result of our intervention.29 
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 Note that, because r is a statistical property of the entire population, it is not a variable on which one can 
typically intervene directly in the context of formal modelling. Instead, one would intervene on the parameters 
of the model (such as the R-parameter in the synergy game) that determine the value of r. Nevertheless, one 
might intuitively expect it to be the case that intervening on the parameters that determine r, such that r 
increases, would promote the evolution of cooperation. It is important to see that this intuition is often incorrect. 
28
 For example: in the synergy game, they are all functions of R, the parameter that sets the differential 
probability that social partners play identical strategies. 
29
 This will occur in cases in which the D-payoff is negative and larger in magnitude than the B-payoff. For 
example, suppose 4B = , 2C = − , 8D = − , and
Co
0.1f = . At R = 0.25, 0.4rb c− = and HRG is satisfied. But at 
R = 0.5, 0.4rb c− = −  and HRG is not satisfied. We can picture this as a case of severely diminishing returns: 
when cooperators interact with other cooperators, the diminishing returns more than cancel out the original 
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 One might also expect it to be the case that, if HRG is satisfied, cooperation will tend 
to be selected in the long run. Again, however, HRG licences no such prediction. This is 
because, when the b and c coefficients are functions of
Co
f , they are likely to change from one 
generation to the next as the frequency of cooperators changes. The implication is that the 
fact that HRG is satisfied in one generation cannot give us any confidence that it will still be 
satisfied in later generations, and therefore cannot give us any confidence that cooperation 
will be stable in the long run.30 
It may be tempting, at this point, to reply that we can use HRG to predict the effects of 
interventions (and to predict long-run outcomes) as long as we understand the precise nature 
of the relationship between the coefficients in HRG and the parameters governing the 
evolutionary dynamics of the system under investigation. For instance, if we know the 
precise way in which intervening to increase r will impact on b and c, we will be able to 
predict whether this intervention will make the evolution of cooperation more or less likely. 
Yet this reply, it seems to me, does little to assuage our concerns about the predictive power 
of HRG. For the relationship between the terms in HRG and the dynamical parameters is 
highly system-specific: the results Gardner et al. ([2011]) derive in the context of two-player 
synergy games do not generalize to (say) three-player games, asymmetric games, n-player 
public goods games, and so on. If we accept that HRG is predictively inert in the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
benefit. Naturally, it is an empirical question how often scenarios of this sort arise in nature, but there is no 
reason to assume that they represent a merely theoretical possibility. 
30
 The sign of rb – c may be affected by changes in frequency whenever expected D-payoff makes a significant 
difference to the direction of evolution, since the expected D-payoff is sensitive to
Co
f . For example, suppose 
again that 4B = , 2C = − , 8D = − , and R = 0.25. At
Co
0.1f = , 0.4rb c− = and HRG is satisfied. But at
Co
0.5f = , 2rb c− = −  and HRG is not satisfied.  
33 
 
system-specific functions relating its coefficients to the underlying dynamical parameters, we 
are, in effect, conceding that the predictive generality HRG appears to afford is illusory: to do 
serious predictive work with HRG, we must first find a way of expressing the relevant 
regression coefficients in terms of the dynamical parameters of the particular evolving system 
under study—and then the generality vanishes. 
In summary, the problem for HRG can be put like this: while HRG holds for every 
evolving system to which the Price equation applies, it does not by itself entail any 
substantive predictions about the effects of interventions on these systems, or about how they 
will evolve in the long run. We can derive such predictions by augmenting HRG with 
expressions relating its terms to the dynamical parameters of the system under investigation, 
but these expressions are highly system-specific. We therefore face a trade-off. By construing 
Hamilton’s rule as HRG rather than HRS, we buy generality at the expense of predictive 
power. We can buy back some of that predictive power by augmenting HRG with system-
specific functions relating its coefficients to the underlying dynamics, but we do so at the 
expense of the predictive generality we originally hoped to gain.  
 
6.2 The unification response  
It therefore seems clear that HRG has serious predictive limitations. Yet whether that strips 
HRG of any explanatory power is another matter. Implicit in Nowak and colleagues’ move 
from the predictive limitations of HRG to an attack on its ‘explanatory power’ is the 
assumption that, at least in the context of evolutionary theory, ‘explanatory work’ consists in 
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laying bare the dynamics of an evolutionary process in a way that enables long-run predictive 
success. The argument is that HRG, couched as it is in terms of overall statistical properties 
of the population, is no good for this kind of work—particularly in cases of non-additive 
interaction or frequency-dependent selection. 
This is a conception of ‘explanatory power’ to which evolutionary game theory seems 
particularly well-suited. Yet it is not the only conception of explanatory power one might 
have. According to one long-running tradition in the philosophy of science, unification also 
counts for something: the thought, roughly speaking, is that, by bringing together disparate 
processes within a unifying framework, we increase our understanding of the causal structure 
of the world (see Kitcher [1989]; Strevens [2004], [2008]). I will not attempt to defend this 
conception of explanation here. I merely want to note that such a conception affords 
considerable value to unifying principles which abstract away from the details of particular 
models in order to capture, at a coarse-grained level, salient similarities between otherwise 
disparate processes. A unificationist conception of explanation allows that such generality has 
intrinsic explanatory value, whether or not it facilitates long-run predictive success or enables 
us to answer ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ questions regarding the effects of 
interventions. 
The defender of HRG can therefore allow that it has serious predictive limitations and 
yet maintain that it still has explanatory value. For HRG identifies a common feature that all 
processes of social evolution by natural selection must share: they are all processes that 
satisfy the condition 0rb c− > , where the coefficients r, b and c are understood in statistical 
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terms. In this way, HRG constitutes a unifying principle: a means of bringing together results 
from disparate models under a single conceptual framework.31 
  
6.3 A worry about this response 
HRG constitutes a very general condition that all processes of social evolution by natural 
selection must satisfy, regardless of their underlying causal differences; in this sense, it 
constitutes a unifying principle for social evolution theory.  This seems like a promising 
response to Nowak and colleagues’ criticisms of HRG, but it is not without its difficulties. 
One concern is that, if all we want is a condition that all processes of social evolution by 
natural selection must satisfy, we could achieve it rather more straightforwardly through 
‘Robertson’s rule’, which states that a social behaviour will be favoured by selection if and 
only if the simple regression of fitness on the genetic value for that behaviour is positive (see 
Robertson [1966]): 
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 Some remarks of Gardner et al. ([2007]) point towards a unificationist conception of the value of Hamilton’s 
rule: ‘The most powerful and simple approach to evolutionary problems is to start with a method such as 
population genetics, ... game theory or direct-fitness maximization techniques. The results of these analyses can 
then be interpreted within the frameworks that Price’s theorem and Hamilton’s rule provide. The correct use of 
these powerful theorems is to translate the results of such disparate analyses, conducted with a variety of 
methodologies and looking at very different problems, into the common language of social evolution theory’ 
(Gardner et al. [2007], p. 224). 
,
   0 iff 0s w gg β∆ > >(Robertson's rule)
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The derivation of Robertson’s rule exactly parallels that of HRG (see Section 2.2). 
The only difference is that, instead of using two predictor variables in the linear regression 
model, we use a single predictor variable: the genetic value of the focal individual. This 
simple regression runs together the effects of the focal individual’s genes and the effects of 
any correlated genes into a single measure of the overall association between genetic value 
and fitness. It is no less accurate for doing so: just like HRG, Robertson’s rule is an a priori 
implication of the Price equation, and will hold in any population to which the Price equation 
applies. Consequently, it too identifies a common feature that all processes of social 
evolution by natural selection must share: they are all processes for which
,
0
w g
β > . 
It is tempting to object that, while Robertson’s rule may be fully general, it is just too 
simple to be predictively useful when organisms interact socially, for it compresses all the 
causal influences on the direction of evolution into a single regression coefficient. Yet, while 
this is true enough, we have already seen that HRG also compresses the causal influences on 
the direction of evolution into a small number of coefficients in a way that impairs its 
predictive utility whenever social interactions are non-additive. The only difference is that 
HRG uses two coefficients rather than one: it partitions the simple regression of fitness on 
genetic value into a ‘–c’ component and an ‘rb’ component.  
The worry is that, if all we care about is generality, then nothing is gained by 
partitioning the simple regression of fitness on genotype into two components: we may as 
well use Robertson’s rule as our unifying principle. But if we want a rule that represents each 
of the distinct causal influences on fitness in a separate term, and that is therefore useful for 
prediction, intervention and causal explanation, we will often need to split the regression of 
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fitness on genotype into more than two components (cf. Queller [1985], [1992b], [2011]; 
Frank [1998]). Either way, the theoretical role for HRG appears to be somewhat limited. 
 
6.4 Causal interpretation revisited 
In Section 5, we encountered the suggestion that, at least under some circumstances, 
regression coefficients may be interpreted as measures of causal effects, and we saw how 
distinguishing the mathematical representation of Hamilton’s rule from its causal 
interpretation exposes a flaw in the ‘tautology’ complaint against HRG. Now, I want to 
suggest that the causal interpretability of regression coefficients also shows how HRG can 
perform a theoretical function that Robertson’s rule cannot. For, crucially, HRG admits of a 
causal interpretation under a broader range of conditions than Robertson’s rule. As a result, 
HRG, in contrast to Robertson’s rule, identifies an important causal feature that unites the 
processes by which social behaviour evolves. 
To see why HRG admits of a causal interpretation under a broader range of conditions 
than Robertson’s rule, we can return to the synergy game. Since Robertson’s rule, like HRG, 
holds for any evolutionary process (by virtue of being an a priori implication of the Price 
equation), it holds in the synergy game. Its single coefficient, 
,w g
β , compresses all the effects 
relevant to the direction of evolution—namely, the B, C, and D payoffs—into a single, overall 
measure of the statistical association between fitness and genetic value: 
 
 
( )( ), Co1w g C RB R R f Dβ = − + + + −
38 
 
 
In compressing all the influences on the direction of evolution into a single 
coefficient,
,w g
β conflates distinct causal pathways; the result is that it cannot plausibly be 
regarded as measuring the causal effect of one’s own genotype on one’s fitness. One way to 
see this is to imagine what we would have to say, if we insisted on interpreting it in this way: 
we would have to say that the focal individual is causally responsible not merely for C, a 
payoff that results directly from its own behaviour, but also for B, a payoff that results 
directly from the behaviour of its social partners. Plainly, this interpretation could only be 
correct if the focal individual were causally responsible for the behaviour of its social 
partners; and, while this might be true in some cases, it is not true in the synergy game.32 This 
is just one instance of a quite general problem for the causal interpretability of Robertson’s 
rule: if 
,w g
β  is to sustain a causal interpretation, one’s own genotype must be causally 
responsible for all the fitness effects with which it correlates. Provided each social partner 
retains control of its own behaviour, this assumption will fail in any case in which genetic 
relatives interact socially. 
The situation for the regression coefficients in HRG is not so bleak. Recall that, in a 
synergy game, the b and c regression coefficients in HRG take account not only of the B and 
C payoffs in the payoff matrix, but also of the D payoff. They do so in a way that splits the 
expected synergistic effect evenly between the b and c terms: 
                                                           
32
 If R is positive, the behaviour of the focal individual will correlate with the behaviour of its social partners, 
and this will lead to a non-causal correlation between its own behaviour and the probability that it receives the B 
payoff. There is no suggestion, however, that the behaviour of its social partners causally depends on its own 
behaviour, and this is what would have to be the case for 
,w g
β to sustain a causal interpretation. 
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Can b and c be interpreted as measures of causal effects in the synergy game? They can, 
conditional on the assumption that, when a fitness effect depends symmetrically on the 
behaviour of two agents, it is reasonable to attribute an equal portion of the resultant effect to 
the behaviour of each agent. If this assumption is correct, then b and c do indeed measure, 
respectively, the causal effect of one’s own genotype on one’s fitness and of one’s social 
partner’s genotype on one’s fitness, since they correctly apportion causal responsibility for 
both the linear effects B and C and the synergistic effect D. Moreover, I submit that the 
assumption is at least prima facie plausible. Critics of HRG may wish to dispute this 
assumption, and this may present a productive avenue for further discussion. For now, I 
merely want to note that, conditional on a plausible assumption about how causal 
responsibility ought to be apportioned in cases of synergistic interaction, the coefficients in 
HRG admit of a causal interpretation in such cases, even though they cannot be equated with 
any of the parameters in the payoff matrix. 
This suggests that our concern about the unification response was misplaced. It is true 
enough that HRG is not the simplest rule one can formulate regarding the conditions under 
which a social behaviour is favoured by natural selection. But it is the simplest such rule that 
also plausibly admits of a causal interpretation across a wide range of cases, including cases 
( )( )
( )( )
Co
Co
1
1
1
1
1
1
b B R R f D
R
c C R R f D
R
= + + −
+
= − + −
+
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of synergistic interaction. The upshot is that HRG-qua-explanatory-principle captures a 
substantial causal insight about the evolution of social behaviour that Robertson’s rule does 
not capture. This is the insight that many, perhaps all, of the processes through which social 
behaviour evolves are united by the following causal feature: they are processes in which the 
causal effect of an individual’s genotype on its own fitness, plus the relatedness-scaled causal 
effect of its social partner’s genotype on its fitness, is greater than zero.  
This point brings together the discussions in Sections 5 and 6. The causal 
interpretability of regression coefficients under appropriate conditions shows how HRG can 
be more than a mere tautology. But it does something else too: it also shows how HRG can 
serve an important explanatory function irrespective of whether it enables long-run predictive 
success. Because its coefficients are causally interpretable in a wide range of cases, HRG-
qua-explanatory-principle identifies a substantial causal unity to the processes by which 
social behaviour evolves. Because its coefficients are not causally interpretable in a wide 
range of cases, Robertson’s rule does not. 
 
7  The Heart of the Matter 
The current controversy regarding Hamilton’s rule has brought to the fore subtle but divisive 
issues in the foundations of social evolution theory. While the bones of contention are also 
partly empirical—and while Nowak et al. are surely guilty of underplaying kin selection’s 
empirical track record—there are also significant conceptual issues at stake. I have argued 
that, to understand the nature of the debate, we need to distinguish two versions of 
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Hamilton’s rule: a special version (HRS) in which the ‘b’ and ‘c’ terms represent fecundity 
payoffs; and a general version (HRG), derived from the Price equation, in which the ‘b’ and 
‘c’ terms represent partial regression coefficients. And I have argued that, on a charitable 
reconstruction, Nowak and colleagues’ argument is that HRS almost never holds, while HRG 
buys its generality at the expense of explanatory power. While their criticisms of HRS are 
difficult to argue with, their criticisms of HRG are more contentious. Yet they have gone 
largely unanswered in the subsequent debate.  
Close examination of these criticisms reveals the importance of a further distinction: 
that between HRG-qua-mathematical-theorem and HRG-qua-explanatory-principle, where 
the latter takes for granted the causal interpretability of the ‘b’ and ‘c’ coefficients. This 
distinction, and the attention it draws to questions of causal interpretability, is valuable for 
two reasons. First, it shows how HRG can come to embody substantial causal content about 
social-evolutionary processes—content that is empirically grounded in a wide range of cases, 
but that is by no means ‘always true’—even though its formal derivation makes no 
substantive assumptions about the population it describes. This helps assuage Nowak and 
colleagues’ concern that HRG is no more than a mathematical tautology. Second, the 
distinction shows how HRG can serve a valuable explanatory function in spite of its serious 
predictive limitations. For the primary theoretical value of HRG lies not in its ability to 
underwrite predictions about long-run evolutionary outcomes, but rather in its identification 
of a common causal feature that unites the processes by which social behaviour evolves.  
 The considerations I have brought to bear are not intended to settle the debate once 
and for all. Live issues remain—in particular, issues concerning the relative importance of 
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unification and prediction in evolutionary explanations, and concerning the correct procedure 
for apportioning causal responsibility in cases of synergistic interaction—that may yet divide 
Hamilton’s defenders from their opponents, and that are unlikely to be settled definitively by 
empirical or theoretical considerations alone. The debate is therefore unlikely to go away. My 
primary aim has been to clarify precisely what is at stake, and to give Hamilton’s defenders 
and opponents a common vocabulary in which to communicate with one another. Throughout 
much of the debate following Nowak and colleagues’ ([2010]) article, theorists have been 
talking at cross-purposes. Even the notion at the very heart of the debate—‘Hamilton’s 
rule’—is ambiguous. Only by distinguishing special and general versions of the rule, and by 
distinguishing the rule’s mathematical representation from its causal interpretation, can we 
hope to move towards a more productive discussion of its uses and limits. 
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